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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This case — involving tens of thousands of dollars in 
statutory damages, half a jury trial, and cross-appeals — stems 
from a debt collector’s pursuit of $25 in unpaid medical bills. 
John Daubert won summary judgment on his Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claim against NRA Group, 
LLC but he lost at trial on his Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) claim. NRA appeals. Daubert cross-appeals. We’ll 
affirm on the TCPA claim but reverse and remand on the 
FDCPA claim. 
I 
It started with lower-back pain. Daubert went to Wilkes-
Barre General Hospital for treatment. The Hospital’s radiology 
department, operated by Radiology Associates of Wyoming 
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Valley, x-rayed him. His bill was $46. Radiology Associates 
forwarded his medical report and cellphone number to the 
company that billed its patients, Medical Billing Management 
Services, or MBMS.  Daubert’s health-insurer contributed $21, 
so Daubert was responsible for the remaining $25. He 
apparently didn’t pay (it’s unclear why). So MBMS transferred 
his account to a debt collector, NRA, passing along Daubert’s 
cell number. 
 NRA attempted to collect the $25 that Daubert owed 
Radiology Associates in two ways. First, it sent him a collection 
letter through an independent vendor. Visible through glassine 
windows on the envelope were — Daubert alleged — the bare 
sequence of letters and numbers NRA used to keep track of 
Daubert’s collection account in its system and — undisputedly 
— a barcode that, when scanned by the appropriate reader, 
revealed that account number. Second, NRA called Daubert 
sixty-nine times in ten months. He answered just once. Each call 
was made using a Mercury Predictive Dialer. Calls were made 
according to campaigns created by Charlene Sarver, NRA’s 
collections director. Campaigns used preselected criteria to pick 
the accounts and phone numbers the Dialer could access. 
Daubert sued NRA in Pennsylvania state court. He 
alleged violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The 
bare account number and barcode on the collection letter’s 
envelope, he claimed, could’ve revealed his private information. 
NRA removed the case to the District Court and filed an answer 
pressing a “bona fide error” defense to Daubert’s FDCPA claim. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).  
A month before discovery’s end Daubert filed a motion 
to amend his complaint. Based on the sixty-nine calls he 
received and the Dialer’s automation he wanted to allege a 
violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227. NRA opposed the 
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motion but the District Court granted it. So NRA amended its 
answer adding a “prior express consent” defense to Daubert’s 
new TCPA claim. See id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
Daubert served NRA with a deposition notice under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). It was delivered two 
weeks before the deposition was to occur. It said NRA was to 
pick a witness ready to testify on its behalf about things 
germane to Daubert’s FDCPA and TCPA claims. For his TCPA 
claim Daubert wanted information about any automated dialing 
system NRA used to call third parties.   
NRA designated Anita Schaar, director of payment 
processing, as its 30(b)(6) witness. At her deposition she was 
asked, “Are you able to testify about all the information known 
or readily available to NRA Group, LLC about [the] topics [in 
the 30(b)(6) notice]?,” to which she responded, “Yes.” J.A. 153. 
She was asked, “Is there anything you think you could have 
done to have prepared more for today’s deposition?” J.A. 154. 
She said, “No, I don’t think so,” but mentioned she could’ve 
spoken to her coworker Charlene Sarver who “might” have had 
“more technical information” about the Dialer than she. J.A. 
155. Schaar went on to explain how NRA’s employees only 
generate calling campaigns. The Dialer, she said, is otherwise 
fully automated: 
Q.  . . . So how is a phone call placed through 
 the dialer system? 
A.  There is a campaign created. 
Q.  And this is the type of campaign that 
 Charlene [Sarver] would create? 
A.  Yes . . . . 
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Q. Is a human being involved in the 
 placement of any phone calls made on 
 the dialer, with the exception of creating a 
 campaign? 
A. I — I don’t know. I don’t think there’s any 
 other way to — no. The dialer does the 
 dialing. 
Q.  Okay. So a human being selects the 
 campaign criteria but then the dialer 
 actually places the phone call? 
A.  Correct. 
Q.  Okay. When does an employee of NRA 
 first get involved in a phone call that’s 
 been placed? 
A.  When someone answers the phone . . . . 
Q.  . . . If a phone call is not answered by a 
 debtor, is an NRA employee ever involved 
 in that phone call? 
A.  No. 
J.A. 198–99, 206–207. 
When discovery closed Daubert asked for summary 
judgment on his FDCPA and TCPA claims. For his TCPA claim 
he cited, among other things, Schaar’s 30(b)(6) testimony and 
his own affidavit saying he “never provided” Radiology 
Associates or NRA his cell number or “permission” to call his 
cell number. J.A. 137–38. 
In opposing Daubert’s summary-judgment motion NRA 
submitted an affidavit it didn’t produce during discovery. It was 
from Charlene Sarver. There Sarver contradicted Schaar’s 
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30(b)(6) testimony. The Dialer can’t make phone calls without 
“human intervention,” she said, as a person must first “hit the 
‘F4’ key on a keyboard.” J.A. 380. Doing so triggers the Dialer, 
she claimed, causing it to “go through the accounts” stored in 
NRA’s system to select one meeting a campaign’s criteria. Id. 
“Without a collector hitting the ‘F4’” key, she swore, the Dialer 
“cannot make a phone call.” Id. 
The District Court granted Daubert summary judgment 
on his TCPA claim. Relying in part on Schaar’s 30(b)(6) 
testimony the court found no genuine dispute that NRA violated 
the TCPA by autodialing Daubert’s cellphone sixty-nine times 
without his prior express consent. Applying the sham-affidavit 
doctrine the court declined to consider Sarver’s contradictory 
affidavit, binding NRA to Schaar’s 30(b)(6) testimony. Daubert 
was owed $500 in statutory damages for each TCPA violation 
($500 × 69 calls = $34,500). See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(B). 
The court, however, denied Daubert summary judgment 
on his FDCPA claim. It held that while the barcode 
undisputedly visible through the envelope violated the FDCPA, 
a reasonable jury could conclude that NRA relied in good faith 
on two federal district court decisions deeming similar barcodes 
legal under the FDCPA. So a genuine, material factual dispute 
existed on whether NRA’s FDCPA violation was “not 
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding 
the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid” it. 
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). A jury trial was scheduled to resolve that 
dispute.  
At trial NRA moved for judgment as a matter of law on 
Daubert’s FDCPA claim under Rule 50(a). Despite finding that 
whether the account number was visible alongside the barcode 
was a “clear jury question,” J.A. 677, the court granted the 
motion, holding that no reasonable jury could find that either 
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alleged FDCPA violation resulted from anything other than an 
unintentional, bona fide error. With that the court discharged the 
jury and entered final judgment. These appeals followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. We have it under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. 
Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2017). Summary 
judgment is warranted if the moving party shows there’s “no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact” and he’s “entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
drawing all inferences in its favor. Steele, 855 F.3d at 500.  
Though we’ve yet to say so expressly, we review a 
district court’s decision to exclude materials under the sham-
affidavit doctrine for abuse of discretion. See Hackman v. Valley 
Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991) (A court “may” 
disregard an affidavit under the doctrine.); cf. EBC, Inc. v. Clark 
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 267–70 (3d Cir. 2010) (Courts 
“may, in their discretion, choose to allow contradictory 
changes” to deposition testimony.). Most courts of appeals do 
the same. See Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l HEPA Certificate 
Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 2016); France v. Lucas, 836 
F.3d 612, 622 (6th Cir. 2016); Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., 599 
F.3d 856, 867 (8th Cir. 2010); Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 
1079 (9th Cir. 2012); Law Co. v. Mohawk Constr. & Supply 
Co., 577 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009); Telfair v. First 
Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1337, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 
2000); cf. Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 504 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (“We review for an abuse of discretion the district 
court’s decision to disregard parts of a plaintiff’s affidavit.”). 
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But see Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 n.* (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (suggesting de novo review applies). 
III 
A 
NRA first says the District Court was wrong to grant 
Daubert summary judgment on his TCPA claim. A reasonable 
jury, it argues, could find that Daubert gave his “prior express 
consent” to receive calls about his bill. We disagree.  
“Congress passed the TCPA to protect individual 
consumers from receiving intrusive and unwanted calls.” Gager 
v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013); see 
Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372–73 (2012). 
To that end the TCPA bars “any person within the United 
States” from making calls to a phone number assigned to a 
“cellular telephone service” using an “automatic telephone 
dialing system.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Excepted from 
this proscription are calls made with the “prior express consent 
of the called party.” Id. That language is in issue here. Our 
analysis of the TCPA’s scope is guided by the statute’s text, the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) interpretations 
of the statute, the statute’s purpose, and “our understanding of 
the concept of consent as it exists in the common law.” Gager, 
727 F.3d at 268.  
Starting with the statute’s text we note Congress left 
“prior express consent of the called party” undefined. When a 
phrase goes undefined in a statute we give it its ordinary 
meaning. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 556 
(3d Cir. 2017). The ordinary meaning of express consent is 
consent “clearly and unmistakably stated.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 346 (9th ed. 2011); see Satterfield v. Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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We next look to the FCC’s rulings interpreting the 
TCPA. Congress requires the FCC to “prescribe regulations to 
implement the [TCPA’s] requirements.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 
The FCC “may, by rule or order,” exempt from § 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii) certain calls made to cellphones. Id. § 
227(b)(2)(C). It has done so. On the issue of prior express 
consent the FCC has found that “persons who knowingly release 
their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or 
permission to be called at the number which they have given, 
absent instructions to the contrary.” 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8769 
(1992). The FCC later added that “autodialed . . . calls to 
wireless numbers that are provided by the called party to a 
creditor in connection with an existing debt are permissible as 
calls made with the ‘prior express consent’ of the called party.” 
23 F.C.C. Rcd. 559, 559 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Ruling]. In 
other words, the FCC says, the “provision of a cell phone 
number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a credit application, 
reasonably evidences prior express consent by the cell phone 
subscriber to be contacted at that number regarding the debt” if 
the number was provided “during the transaction that resulted in 
the debt owed.” Id. at 564–65. Further, “[c]alls placed by a third 
party creditor on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the 
creditor itself placed the call.” Id. at 565.  
That the cell number wasn’t provided directly to the 
creditor, however, isn’t dispositive under the FCC’s rulings. The 
“appropriate analysis turns on whether the called party granted 
permission or authorization” to be called, “not on whether the 
creditor received the [cell] number directly.” Mais v. Gulf Coast 
Collection Bureau, Inc., 768 F.3d 1110, 1123 (11th Cir. 2014). 
So a cellphone subscriber “could provide his number to a 
creditor” and “grant prior express consent to receive autodialed 
or prerecorded calls” by “affirmatively giving an intermediary 
like [a hospital] permission to transfer the number to [his 
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creditor] for use in billing.” Id. at 1124. The FCC’s rulings 
“make no distinction between directly providing one’s cell 
phone number to a creditor and taking steps to make that 
number available through other methods, like consenting to 
disclose that number to other entities for certain purposes.” 
Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc., 813 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 
2016). 
Turning to the TCPA’s purpose we reiterate that the 
statute is remedial in nature and “should be construed to benefit 
consumers.” Gager, 727 F.3d at 271; see Leyse v. Bank of Am. 
Nat’l Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 327 (3d Cir. 2015). 
Finally we reaffirm that Congress “did not intend to 
depart from the common law understanding of consent.” Gager, 
727 F.3d at 270. The statute doesn’t treat the term differently 
from its common law usage under which the basic premise of 
consent is that it’s “given voluntarily.” Id. (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 346 (9th ed. 2009)); accord Osorio v. State Farm 
Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2014). 
Applying these principles we agree with the District 
Court that no reasonable jury could find that Daubert expressly 
consented to receive calls from NRA about his $25 debt. As the 
party claiming Daubert’s “prior express consent” NRA 
would’ve been required to prove it at trial. See 2008 Ruling, 23 
F.C.C. Rcd. at 565; cf. Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC, 793 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Osorio, 746 F.3d 
at 1253). So to carry his burden as the party seeking summary 
judgment Daubert needed to show the “absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact” on his prior express consent. Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (emphasis added); 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). This he did.   
There’s no direct evidence Daubert gave his prior express 
consent to receive calls to Radiology Associates (his creditor). 
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The circumstantial evidence suggests, and Daubert concedes it’s 
reasonable to infer, that he gave his cell number to the Hospital 
(an intermediary associated with his creditor) when he was 
admitted there. But we agree with the District Court that more is 
required to show a genuine dispute on prior express consent. 
Baisden and Mais persuade us.  
The Sixth Circuit found prior express consent where the 
plaintiffs gave their cell numbers to a hospital-intermediary in 
signing admittance forms. Baisden, 813 F.3d at 340–41. Those 
forms said, for instance, “I understand” the hospital “may use 
my health information” for “billing and payment,” id. at 340 
(emphasis removed), and may “release my health information” 
to “companies who provide billing services” (i.e., creditors), id. 
at 341 (emphasis removed). Similarly the Eleventh Circuit 
found prior express consent where the plaintiff’s wife gave her 
husband’s cell number to a hospital-intermediary in signing 
admittance forms on his behalf. Mais, 768 F.3d at 1113–14. 
Those forms gave the hospital permission to, for example, 
“release” his “healthcare information” for the purpose of 
“payment,” id., to “use and disclose” his “health information” to 
“bill [him] and collect payment,” and to “disclose” his “health 
information” to its “business associate[s]” (i.e., creditors) so 
they could “bill” him, id. at 1114.  
Daubert, of course, could’ve indicated on his Hospital 
intake form (assuming one exists) that he consented to have his 
number transferred to Radiology Associates for billing or other 
purposes. But no evidence of such prior express consent exists 
in the record. By pointing that out, we hold, Daubert carried his 
burden as the movant to show the absence of a genuine, material 
factual dispute on NRA’s prior express consent defense. See 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 
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The burden thus shifted to NRA as the nonmovant to “go 
beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added; internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). So NRA is 
incorrect that the District Court “flipped” the summary-
judgment standard. NRA Br. 18. It didn’t. Rule 56 did. And 
under that rule NRA had to do more than “simply show that 
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. It was “put up or shut up time” for 
NRA as the nonmovant. Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 
195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006). NRA managed to show only that 
Daubert maybe provided his cell number to the Hospital, an 
intermediary associated with Radiology Associates. In light of 
Baisden, Mais, and the FCC’s rulings, we don’t think that’s 
enough. The court rightly held that no reasonable jury could 
find that Daubert expressly consented to receive calls about his 
bill from NRA.   
B 
NRA next says the District Court was wrong to disregard 
Charlene Sarver’s affidavit under the sham-affidavit doctrine. 
Her written statement, NRA claims, bars summary judgment for 
Daubert on his TCPA claim because it shows a genuine dispute 
about whether he was called using an “automatic telephone 
dialing system.” We disagree.  
When a nonmovant’s affidavit contradicts earlier 
deposition testimony without a satisfactory or plausible 
explanation, a district court may disregard it at summary 
judgment in deciding if a genuine, material factual dispute 
exists. See Hackman, 932 F.2d at 241; Jiminez v. All Am. 
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Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007). This is the 
sham-affidavit doctrine. In applying it we adhere to a “flexible 
approach,” Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 254, giving due regard to the 
“surrounding circumstances,” Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624 
(3d Cir. 2004).  
If, for example, the witness shows she was “confused at 
the earlier deposition or for some other reason misspoke, the 
subsequent correcting or clarifying affidavit may be sufficient to 
create a material dispute of fact.” Martin v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 705 (3d Cir. 1988); see Jiminez, 503 
F.3d at 254. Same result if there’s “independent evidence in the 
record to bolster an otherwise questionable affidavit.” Baer, 392 
F.3d at 625. 
The court may, on the other hand, disregard an affidavit 
when the “affiant was carefully questioned on the issue, had 
access to the relevant information at that time, and provided no 
satisfactory explanation for the later contradiction.” Martin, 851 
F.2d at 706; see Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 254. It may similarly 
disregard an affidavit “entirely unsupported by the record and 
directly contrary to [other relevant] testimony,” Jiminez, 503 
F.3d at 254, or if it’s “clear” the affidavit was offered “solely” 
to defeat summary judgment, id. at 253; see In re CitX Corp., 
Inc., 448 F.3d 672, 679 (3d Cir. 2006); Martin, 851 F.2d at 705. 
The District Court, we hold, acted well within its 
discretion to disregard Sarver’s affidavit. Her sworn written 
statement flatly contradicted Schaar’s earlier 30(b)(6) 
testimony. Schaar testified that the Dialer can make calls 
without human intervention. Sarver later swore it can’t. So NRA 
had to give the District Court a “satisfactory explanation” for 
this discrepancy. Hackman, 932 F.2d at 241. It didn’t. 
NRA, for instance, failed to point the District Court to 
any “independent evidence in the record” corroborating Sarver’s 
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affidavit. Baer, 392 F.3d at 625. None exists. NRA admitted 
that much in its brief opposing summary judgment. There it 
noted that apart from Schaar’s 30(b)(6) testimony and Sarver’s 
affidavit, there’s “absolutely no mention” of the Dialer “in the 
factual record.” J.A. 360. Why? NRA blamed Daubert: He 
never asked for the Dialer’s “detailed specifications” or “even 
something as simple as the model number.” Id. But even if 
that’s true, NRA could’ve asked for a chance to supplement the 
record before the District Court ruled on Daubert’s summary-
judgment motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2) (“If a nonmovant 
shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it 
cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” the 
district court “may allow time to obtain affidavits or 
declarations or to take discovery.”); Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 
F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015). It didn’t. We’re left to conclude 
that no independent record evidence corroborates Sarver’s 
contradictory affidavit.  
NRA also made no serious effort to explain to the 
District Court why it believed Schaar was “‘understandably’ 
mistaken, confused, or not in possession of all the facts” about 
the Dialer during her deposition. Jiminez, 503 F.3d at 254. NRA 
knew Daubert wanted information about, for instance, “[e]ach 
system” that’s an “automatic telephone dialing system” or that 
can place a call “without any human contemporaneously dialing 
the telephone number.” J.A. 245. NRA had two weeks to pick 
and prepare a witness to testify on its behalf about these matters. 
It picked Schaar. She testified she was ready, willing, and able 
to speak for her company about the topics listed in the 30(b)(6) 
notice. And she did exactly that. More than once she said the 
Dialer is automated unless someone answers the call on the 
other end. So her testimony belies what NRA told the District 
Court in submitting Sarver’s contradictory affidavit: that Schaar 
had “no technical knowledge about the inner workings of the 
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phone system,” J.A. 356, and “no information at all about the 
telephone system,” J.A. 359. The District Court didn’t abuse its 
discretion by disregarding these explanations.  
NRA uses a similar strategy on appeal. It says Schaar 
“made it abundantly clear” to Daubert’s counsel during her 
deposition that “she was not prepared to discuss the technical 
aspects of the Mercury Dialer, had no personal information 
about the Mercury Dialer, and that [Daubert’s] counsel was 
better off speaking with Ms. Sarver about these issues.” NRA 
Third Step Br. 31. But that’s not true. Schaar said she “[m]aybe” 
could’ve spoken to Sarver who “might” know more about the 
Dialer than she and that doing so would’ve taken her “[m]aybe 
30 minutes.” J.A. 155–56. These contentions, like NRA’s 
contentions to the District Court, don’t show that Schaar was 
understandably mistaken, confused, or not in possession of all 
the facts. Nor do they show an abuse of discretion. 
No satisfactory explanation was offered for Sarver’s 
contradictory affidavit. The District Court didn’t abuse its 
discretion in declining to indulge NRA’s attempt to paper over 
Schaar’s damning 30(b)(6) testimony with Sarver’s affidavit. 
NRA raises no other challenges, so we’ll affirm summary 
judgment for Daubert on his TCPA claim. We move to 
Daubert’s cross-appeal. 
C 
Daubert contests the District Court’s decision to grant 
NRA judgment as a matter of law on his FDCPA claim. NRA’s 
bona fide error defense founders, he says, because it’s premised 
on a mistake of law. We agree.   
Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors.” Douglass v. Convergent 
Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 15 
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U.S.C. § 1692(e)). To further that goal the FDCPA bars debt 
collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means” to 
collect a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Subparagraph 8, in issue here, 
prohibits debt collectors from “[u]sing any language or symbol, 
other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when 
communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by 
telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name 
if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection 
business.” Id. § 1692f(8).  
We’ve held that a debt collector violates § 1692f(8) by 
sending a collection letter in an envelope that displays the 
debtor’s bare account number. Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303. This 
practice “implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA” — 
the “invasion of privacy” — because an account number is a 
“core piece of information” pertaining to the debtor’s “status as 
a debtor.” Id. But we left open whether a debt collector violates 
§ 1692f(8) by displaying a barcode (in Douglass, a QR code) on 
an envelope that, when scanned, reveals the debtor’s account 
number. Id. at 301 n.4.  
The District Court here answered that open question. It 
held that NRA’s use of a barcode on Daubert’s envelope 
violated § 1692f(8), even if the bare account number itself had 
not been visible. NRA doesn’t challenge that conclusion on 
appeal, so we don’t opine on it. Rather, we focus on the defense 
NRA invoked to avoid liability for the FDCPA violation the 
District Court found. That defense is called the bona fide error 
defense. It says a debt collector can escape liability under the 
FDCPA by proving that its statutory violation was “not 
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding 
the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any 
such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). But the defense doesn’t 
apply if the violation resulted “from a debt collector’s mistaken 
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interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.” Jerman 
v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 
573, 577 (2010). In other words, a mistake of law isn’t a bona 
fide error. 
The District Court here said Jerman doesn’t apply. When 
NRA used the (assumedly) offending barcode, the court 
reasoned, it did so in good-faith reliance on two federal district 
court decisions holding that barcodes don’t violate § 1692f(8): 
Waldron v. Professional Medical Management, 2013 WL 
978933, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2013), and the district court’s 
decision in Douglass, 963 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446–47 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), vacated on other grounds, 765 F.3d 299. The Douglass 
district court had further held that even a visible account number 
doesn’t violate § 1692f(8). 963 F. Supp. 2d at 446. So, the 
District Court held, NRA’s violation was an unintentional, bona 
fide error. We don’t think it was.  
NRA’s defense is substantially similar to the defense the 
debt collector pressed in Jerman. There a law firm filed a 
foreclosure action against a homeowner in state court and 
attached to the complaint a notice saying that unless the 
homeowner disputed the debt in writing it would be presumed 
valid. 559 U.S. at 578–79. The homeowner sued under the 
FDCPA, saying the statute doesn’t require a written dispute. Id. 
at 579 & n.1. Ruling on the law firm’s motion to dismiss, the 
district court recognized that no Sixth Circuit precedential 
opinion had addressed the issue at hand and that other circuit 
and district courts had reached different conclusions. 464 F. 
Supp. 2d 720, 722–25 (N.D. Ohio 2006); see 559 U.S. at 579 
(noting that the district court acknowledged a “division of 
authority on the question”). So the district court followed the 
majority view that the statute doesn’t require a written dispute 
and held that the homeowner adequately pleaded a FDCPA 
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violation. 464 F. Supp. 2d at 725. But after discovery the district 
court granted the law firm summary judgment, ruling that any 
FDCPA violation resulted from an unintentional, bona fide 
error. 502 F. Supp. 2d 686, 693–97 (N.D. Ohio 2007). The law 
firm, the court said, relied in “good faith” on persuasive 
authority from other circuit and district courts deeming its 
conduct legal. Id. at 695–96. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, saying 
the defense applies to “bona fide errors of law.” 538 F.3d 469, 
476 (6th Cir. 2008). 
The Supreme Court disagreed. The bona fide error 
defense, it held, doesn’t apply to FDCPA violations “resulting 
from a debt collector’s mistaken interpretation of the legal 
requirements of the FDCPA.” 559 U.S. at 577. FDCPA 
violations forgivable under § 1692k(c) must result from 
“clerical or factual mistakes,” not mistakes of law. Id. at 587. 
The Court drew support from § 1692k(c)’s language that a debt 
collector must maintain “procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid” errors. Procedures, the Court said, are “processes that 
have mechanical or other such regular orderly steps” designed 
to “avoid errors like clerical or factual mistakes,” and “legal 
reasoning is not a mechanical or strictly linear process” 
amenable to such procedures. Id. at 587 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Jerman controls. Like the underlying legal issue in 
Jerman the legal issue here — whether bare account numbers or 
barcodes violate § 1692f(8) — was unsettled by any relevant 
binding authority. The Supreme Court has never addressed it.  
Before Douglass we hadn’t either, and even there we set aside 
the issue of barcodes. 765 F.3d at 301 n.4. So without binding 
authority NRA did precisely what the law firm did in Jerman: It 
relied on persuasive authority (here, two district court decisions) 
holding that account numbers or barcodes don’t violate the 
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FDCPA. Jerman makes plain that the bona fide error defense 
doesn’t apply in that circumstance. Where an issue of law under 
the FDCPA is unsettled by the Supreme Court or a precedential 
decision of the relevant court of appeals, debt collectors can’t 
escape a district court’s finding of FDCPA liability under the 
bona fide error defense by pointing to the persuasive authority 
they relied on at the time to justify their conduct. We leave for 
another day whether the defense “protects a debt collector from 
liability for engaging in conduct that was expressly permitted 
under the controlling law in effect at the time, but that is later 
prohibited after a retroactive change of law.” Oliva v. Blatt, 
Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 789 (7th 
Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 23, 2016). That’s not 
this case. 
The district court decisions NRA relied on haven’t been 
abrogated with regard to the legality of barcodes under the 
FDCPA. But a district court’s decision, whether published in a 
reporter or not, binds only the parties in that case and “no judge 
in any other case.” Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 
1993). “A decision of a federal district court judge is not 
binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same 
judicial district, or even upon the same [district] judge in a 
different case.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 
(2011) (citation omitted). “[T]here is no such thing as ‘the law 
of the district’” and “stare decisis does not compel one district 
court judge to follow the decision of another.” Threadgill v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 
1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
NRA’s (assumedly) mistaken interpretation of the law is 
inexcusable under the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense 
irrespective of how many district court decisions supported it at 
the time. The District Court’s unchallenged finding that NRA 
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violated the FDCPA stands accordingly. We’ll reverse judgment 
as a matter of law for NRA on Daubert’s FDCPA claim and 
remand with instructions to enter judgment for Daubert and to 
calculate damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). The court 
“shall” weigh the factors in subsection (b)(1) in so doing, 
including the “frequency and persistence of [NRA’s] 
noncompliance,” the “nature of such noncompliance,” and the 
“extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” Id. § 
1692k(b)(1). 
IV 
 For these reasons we’ll affirm in part and reverse in part. 
We’ll affirm summary judgment for Daubert on his TCPA claim 
but reverse judgment as a matter of law for NRA on Daubert’s 
FDCPA claim. We’ll remand that claim with instructions to 
enter judgment for Daubert and to calculate FDCPA damages.   
